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JOSEPH NL EX J
ELOPING BROUGHT UNDER A KID-
NAPPING STATTE.-[Ga.] In Allen
v. State, 3 S. E. (2nd) 780 (Ga.
App. 1939), the court reversed a
kidnapping conviction against a
nineteen year old defendant, who
had, for the bona fide purpose of
marriage, taken a fifteen year old
girl away from her parents, against
their will and without their con-
sent. The court based the deci-
sion upon two grounds: 1) that a
valid common-law marriage had
been consummated, thereby ex-
cluding the defendant from the
scope of the kidnapping statute;
and 2) that the common-law wife
was incompetent to testify against
her husband under the Georgia
Code. The latter point, which ob-
viously is dictum, will not be con-
sidered herein.
The Georgia statute concerned
reads: "Any person who shall
forcibly, maliciously, or fraudu-
lently lead, take, or carry away
I .. , any child under the age of
eighteen years from its parent or
guardian, or against his will, or
without his consent, shall be guilty
of kidnapping." Ga. Code, §26-
1602 (1933). Not only does the
literal meaning of the words lend
itself to a broad construction giv-
ing the statute the effect of a "catch
all", but also, the construction
placed upon it in Gravett v. State,
74 Ga. 191, (1884), Arrington v.
State, 3 Ga. App. 30, 59 S. E. 207,
(1907) an4 reaffirmed in Bryant v.
State, 21 Ga. App. 668, 94 S. E. 856,
(1918) where the court said, "The
object of the statute is twofold, to
protect not only the rights of par-
ents and guardians, but also those
of children", seems to indicate that
the statute was intended to be used
as a "catch all". The courts of
Georgia have held in these cases
that if the act complained against
is contrary to the will and without
the consent of the parent, irrespec-
tive of the child's consent, this
alone completes the offense. Grav-
ett v. State, supra, and Arrington
v. State, supra. However, two
cases (Hendon v. State, 10 Ga.
App. 78, 72 S. E. 522, (1911) and
Cochran v. State, 91 Ga. 763, 18 S.
E. 16, (1893) chisel into the broad
construction given the Georgia kid-
napping statute. The significant
decision is the latter, for it was
relied upon by the court in the
instant case to sustain the assump-
tion that a common-law marriage
[608]
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is beyond the scope of the statute. others. Many states, recognizing
The literal meaning of the statute this fact, apparently have at-
and the court's interpretation in tempted in their kidnapping and
Bryant v. State, supra, and kindred abduction statutes to make the
cases permits no qualification of punishment fit the flagrancy of the
any sort; technically, a taking for violation. For instance, the abduc-
marriage is no bar to a prosecution- tion statute of Texas (Vernon's
for kidnapping. In Cochran v. Tex. Stat., P. C., Art. 1180) pro-
State, supra, the court relied upon vides the following punishment:
§1699 of the Georgia Code which abduction for the purpose of mar-
gives a girl of fourteen or more the riage, a fine not exceeding $2,000;
legal right to contract marriage, when the female is forced into
and held that the defendant could the marriage, a prison sentence of
not be made a felon for an act not less than two nor more than
which the girl involved was au- five years; and if the female is
thorized to make by statute, re- prostituted, a prison sentence
gardless of parental'consent. How- not less than three nor more'
ever, the. kidnapping statute does than twenty years in the peniten-
not recognize this defense of con- tiary. This statute seems typical.
sent. Moreover, the Cochran case, Cf. W. Va. Code Ann. (1937) §5929
being based on a statutory excep- (14); Miss. Code Ann. (1930) 1938
tion to the kidnapping statute is not Supp. §76. In all these statutes,
binding authority for the holding not only is there a greater degree
in the instant case that the mere of flexibility in meting out .punish-
validity of a common-law mar- ment, but also, the minimum pen-
riage brings the case beyond the alty in all of them is much less
scope of the statute. severe than in the kidnapping stat-
The rather strained attempts of ute of Georgia, where the only sen-
both of these courts to exempt mar- tence possible is four to seven years
riages from the kidnapping statute in the penitentiary.
on the basis of consent and legality Marriage, even though it may
(which is not found in the statute) have been contracted against the
were probably prompted by the will of the parents, or without their
recognition that a broadly worded knowledge, is not placed by soci-
statute was technically being ety in the same category of heinous-
stretched to cover a situation never ness as concubinage, prostitution,
intended by the legislature. The or kidnapping for ransom. In fact,
tacit holding of both cases is that it is extremely doubtful Whether
marriage is beyond the scope, of elopements were intended by the
the kidnapping statute. However, various state legislatures to be
the court lays itself open to criti- prosecuted under either kidnap-
cism for failing to place the deci- ping or abduction statutes. How-
sion upon the broad ground that ever, where 'the statute provides
because of the severity and inflexi- a great flexibility of punishment,
bility of the punishment, the kid- and a possibility exists that the de-
napping statute was not intended fendant may not be punished se-
to cover elopement. verely, an assumption that the
Clearly, some violations of a statute does apply may be war-
statute may be more flagrant than ranted. Since society does frown
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upon marriages contracted without
parental consent, i.e., elopements
resulting in child marriages, a judge
may not feel constrained to prevent
a conviction where the opportunity
exists to invoke a light sentence;
but where the punishment is so
inflexible as to create a penalty
entirely out-of-keeping with the
heinousness of the crime, there is
no excuse for such a conviction.
That the penalty of the Georgia
statute is so stringent as to act as
a bar to convictions for elopements
is enhanced further by the Minne-
sota statute which states that one
taking a female under sixteen years
without parental consent, for the
purpose of marriage, is guilty of
abductidn. The penalty for this
crime is imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than five years,
or a fine not to be more than
$1,000, or both. The Minnesota
statute is worded to cover pre-
cisely the situation presented in
the principal case. But Georgia does
not possess an abduction statute;
and only by applying the kidnap-
ping statute to the predicament
presented in the instant case could
the state hope to convict the
defendant. Admitting that the de-
fendant in the instant case techni-
cally violated the kidnapping stat-
ute, nevertheless, the imposition of
such a strict penalty not only would
be unjust, but raises an inference
that "elopment was beyond the
legislative intent in enacting the
statute. That the punishment in-
flicted by the Georgia statute is
too stringent for the crime com-
mitted is also supported by the
fact that an Illinois statute for
the abduction of females (§37.013,
Jones' Ill. Stat. Ann.) in providing
for two more heinous offenses
(concubinage and prostitution)
prescribes punishment less severe.
The court should not have based
its decision on the technical hold-
ing of Cochran v. State, supra, but
should have achieved the same re-
sult upon factors of justice.
Obviously, the Georgia legisla-
ture did not have the instant situa-
tion in mind when it passed the
kidnapping statute. Granting that
it would be wise to discourage such
marriages, the Georgia court was
correct in refusing to allow the
conviction of this defendant be-
cause of the heavy punishment in-
volved. The legislature of Georgia
is under a duty to pass appropriate
laws, if it intends to obstruct such
marriages; a four to seven year
prison sentence is too rigorous and
stringent as a penalty for an elope-
ment-even though the state frowns
upon the marriage of a nineteen
year old youth to a fifteen year old
girl.
GLEN W. RosEN.
VACAT=nG Junmamirs ArTE AP-
PEA [ARK.]. The case of Fletcher
v. State, 128 S. W. (2d) 997 (Ark.,
1939) raises the following question:
has the trial court jurisdiction at
the same term, to vacate prior
judgment of conviction and grant a
new trial where an appeal has al-
ready been perfected in the Su-
preme Court. The court answered
the question in the negative, two
judges dissenting, because of three
prior Arkansas decisions: Freeman
v. State, 158 Ark. 262, 250 S. W.
522 (1922); Emerson v. Boyles, 170
Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005 (1925);
Robinson v. Arkansas Loan Trust
Co., 72 Ark. 475, 81 S. W. 609
(1904). None of these cases, how-
ever, were directly in point and
since no binding precedent could be
found in Arkansas, both the ma-
CRIMNAL CASES
jority and minority were forced to
argue by analogy.
While it is evident that the broad
dicta in these cases favored the po-
sition of the majority, they were by
no means controlling. In the Free-
man case there were two grounds
for decision: (1) that-the term of
court at which the. judgment was
rendered had terminated when-the
order vacating judgment -was
given, (2) that since an -appeal
had been perfected and the judg-,
ment afrmed when the order wai
given, the,trial court acted-in ex-
cess of its jurisdiction. By impli-
cation it may be argued that the
second argument supports the dis-
sent in the principal ,case in-that
here the judgment hasn't been af-
firmed, .-therefore- the trial court
had jurisdiction to make the order.
In the Emerson case, _the accused
had partly executed l#i sentence
in the penitentiarybe fore the va-
cation of judgment was-rendered
a situation, obviously- involving
considerations other than, those
governing the instant case, In the
Robinson case there had been no
vacation of judgment- whatsoeve.
Since no previous ' authority
bound the court, it should have
felt free to decide the question on
the basis of the law in other states
and/or on the merits of the individ-
ual case. In perusing thelaw of other
jurisdictions one finds there i* a
split of authority on the precise
point in controversy. The tradi-
tional view has been that the per-
fection of an appeal lifts the case
out of the-lower court and-diveststhe trial court of jurisdiction to
vacate judgment. Simmons v. U, S.,
89 F. (2d) 591 (1937); People v.
Cruse, 24 Cal. App. 497, 141 P. 936
(1914); Ex'Parte Johannes, 213 Cal.
125, 1 P. (2d) 984 (1931)-;Eggers-V.
Kreuger, 236 Fed. 852 (1916);
United etc. R. ,Co. v. Corbin, 109
Md. 52, 71 AtL 131 (1908); Combes
v. Adams, 150 N..C. 64, 63 S. E. 186
(1908). This holding is usualy lim-
ited to case, as in the principal
case, where the subject-matter, of
the order vacating judgment is the,
same, as, the- subject-matter, of
the appe4 and it has been held
that where the vacation is basedon,
a question other than the one inm-.
volved in the appeal, the trial court-
does have -jurisdiction to vacate
judgment. State v. Patterson, 159
La. 765,106 So. 296 (1925); State V.
Dec Grace,. 144 Ore. 159, 22 P. (2d)
896, 90, A. L. R. 232 -(1933). The'
other line of authority holds 'that,
the mere fact that an appeal hasbeen, take om the judgment
does not divest the -rial court. ofits inherent jurisdiction to vacate'
it under circumstances justifin
that relief, Chattaoogia R. &'C. IL
Co. v. Jackson, 86-Ga. 676, 13S. E.
109 (1891).; Chamblis v. Haas, i25
Iowa- 484, -101 N. W. '153 (1904);,
Blackburn v. Knight 81 Tex. 326,
16 S. W., 1075 (1891); Patterson v.
Hochster, 21 App. Div. 432, 47 N. Y.
553 (1897). Most of these courts
recognize an exception to the effect.
that after a judgment has been af-
firmed on appeal, -te trial court
loses jurisdiction to vacate' it, since
the judgment is in legal effect that
of the appellate court. "McArthur'v.
Dane, 61 Ala. -539 (1878). Ken-
tucky has-a statute on-the particu-
lar point in controversy which
seems to uphold this power of the
trial court. 'See Tillman v. Com-
monwealth, 263- Ky. 488, 92 S. W.
(2d) 755 (1936).
The grounds of support usually
advanced in- behalf of the tradi-
tional view are twofold: (1) that
to follow any other rule would be
6M1,,
CRIMINAL CASES
to put the defendant in jeopardy
twice for the same offense, he hav-
ing been tried once, reasoning by
analogy from the situation where
the accused has partly executed
sentence (the Emerson case,
supra); (2) it would be extremely
inconvenient for two judicial tribu-
nals to have conflicting jurisdiction
over the same subject-matter at
the same time. United etc. R. Co. v.
Corbin, supra. It seems that inso-
far as the first ground is used by
the majority in the principal case
as support, it is not sound. It is
obvious that were the appellate
court to reverse and remand the
instant case with instructions that
there be a new trial, the same re-
sult wouldI be obtained as here, ex-
cept that here the trial court ef-
fected the result. No one would
venture to say that the action of
the appellate court placed the de-
fendant in double jeopardy, so why
contend so here. The second ground,
however, embodies more justifica-
tion for strict adherence to the
traditional viewpoint. To institute
such an innovation as practiced by
the trial judge in the principal case
would be to introduce a new re-
tarding element in the appellate
process contrary to the aims of re-
form, and in effect the result would
be to withdraw a case from the
scrutiny of the appellate court pos-
sibly after it has given study to
the fact situation. A further argu-
ment might be advanced, namely,
that to allow the trial court to va-
cate judgment after an appeal has
been perfected would disintegrate
the amount of certainty requisite for
effective working of the judicial
process, the theory being that if
the trial judge is cognizant of the
fact that he will have an opportu-
nity to vacate judgment after an
appeal has been perfected and cor-
rect his error there will be an
incentive to perform his duties with
more laxity.
The opposing trend of thought
does not cite many arguments in
support of its stand, merely follow-
ing the rule that the trial judge re-
tains jurisdiction at the-same term
to vacate judgment irrespective of
the fact that an appeal has been
perfected. But in the principal
case the trial court vacated judg-
ment on the basis of insufficiency
of the evidence to sustain the con-
viction and the dissent advances
the argument that since the trial
court is more familiar with the
facts, the trial, and testimony in
the case it was proper for the trial
judge to vacate judgment and
grant a new trial even after an ap-
peal had been perfected. A coun-
ter-argument would seem to'be
that since the trial judge has had
ample opportunity to pass on the
legal sufficiency of the evidence by
directing a verdict, or at a later
stage by setting aside the verdict
and judgment before the appeal
is perfected, it hardly seems neces-
sary that he should retain it there-
after. Since, moreover, he has re-
versed his former position, the
question is probably an equivocal
one, and one perhaps properly left
to the determination of the appel-
late court.
DAVID RICE, JR.
RIGHT OF JURORS TO ExAMmE
AND EXPERIMENT WITH EXHIBITS IN
JURY Roo.-[Wyo.] The recent
case of Espy et al. v. State, 92 P. (2)
549 (Wyo., 1939) revives the old
question of just how much liberty
a jury may exercise in examining
and experimenting with exhibits.
The point, though a minor one in
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the whole judicial process, is often
considered by courts in the review
of criminal cases and frequently is
the basis for reversal
The defendants' theory in the in-
stant case is that the blows which
caused death were made with a
club and were given in self-defense,
and that any blow or kick made
thereafter was not mortal, but was
committed on a dead body. To
overcome testimony of physicians
for the state, who informed the.
jury that the bruises (evidently
from kicking) alone might have
caused death even though there
had been no skull fracture, the de-
fendant Chapman had his boots
put into evidence, presumably to
show that they were equipped with
rubber heels which, even if they
had been used in kicking, would
not have caused the injury shown.
At the close of the trial the jury
requested and, with the consent of
the defendants, received possession
of the boots, which were taken into
the jury room. To the motion for
a new trial the defendants attached
the affidavits of three Jurors which
stated that the jurors had removed
the rubber heels "to ascerlain
whether or not there had previ-
ously been steel plates or caps
thereon".
The Supreme Court of Wyoming
overruled the defendants' conten-
tion that there was a reversible
error due to the misconduct of the
jurors in conducting an experiment
without the presence of the de-
fendant, basing its decision on the
distinction between an experiment
and an examination: "We do not
think the removal of the heel caps
from the boots can be called an
experiment. It was a more critical
examination which defendants
should have anticipated when they
consented that the boots be taken
to the jury room."
Experimentation
Generally the decisions of courts
do not favor the making of experi-
ments by the jurors. One of the most
.important reasons for denying this
procedure is that the defendant by
being kept out of the jury room is
deprived of his right to view all
the evidence placed against him
and to make objections whenever
he thinks his case is being unfairly
presented. In some jurisdictions
the state constitution guarantees
the defendant the right to "appear
and defend" and "to meet the wit-
nesses face to face". People v.
White, 365 lL 499, 6 N. EK (2) 1015
"(1937). In certain other" states the
defendant is given this right by
statute. Forhand v. State, 51 Ark.
553, 11 S. W. 766 (1889).
To safeguard these rights of the
defendant, courts have universally
required that all exhibits, whether
for experimentation or for exami-
nation, be first produced at the
trial and be put into evidence be-
fore they can be taken by the jurors
to the jury room. Most courts
which allow any kind of experi-
mentation at all require that the
defendant give s consent, while a
few courts consider it adequate
enough merely if the defense
voices no express objection. Yates
v. People, 38 IMI 527 (1865); Henry
v. Crook, et al., 195 N. Y. Supp. 642
(1922).
One difficulty which arises when
jurors conduct investigations with
exhibits is in the subjecting of the
exhibits to exactly the same con-
dition which existed when the
'original cause of action arose. In
Spires v. State, 39 S. 181 (Fla.,
1905) it was held that a darkroom
experiment to see if a person could
be recognized in the flash created
by firing the defendant's gun would
be error, since the conditions of
darkness, eyesight, size of shot, and
amount of powder used would be
too variable. The California Su-
preme Court states the test used
by most states which allow jury
experimentation: j u r o r s "may
carry out experiments within the
lines of offered evidence; but if
their experiments shall invade new
fields, and they shall be influenced
by discoveries from such experi-
ments which will not fall fairly
within the scope and purview of
the evidence, then the jury has
been itself taking evidence without
the knowledge of either party-evi-
dence whfch it is not possible for
the party injured to meet, answer,
or explain". Higgins v. Los An-
geles Gas & Electric Co., 159 Cal.
651, 115 P. 313 (1911).
In cases where the jurors at-
tempt to reenact the crime accord-
ing to the testimony given on the
trial, courts are lenient in allowing
the use of articles which have been
put into evidence. Saunders v.
State, 4 Okla. Cr. 264, 111 P. 965
(1910); Hoover v. State, 107 Tex.
Cr. 600, 298 S. W. 438 (1927); State
v. Elmers, et al., 198 Ia. 1041, 200
N. W. 723 (1924). However, in
cases where bloody clothes, instru-
ments of death, the skull of the
deceased, etc., are taken into the
jury room, it is the duty of the
courts to make sure that the ex-
hibit will be confined to the pur-
pose for which it was introduced
and not for some ulterior purpose.
Surely it should be held error
where such evidence is allowed in
the jury room which sets off heated
passions or makes jurors become
sick. Puryear v. State, 50 Tex. Cr.
CRIMINAL CASES
454, 98 S. W. 258 (1900); People v.
Morris, 254 Ill. 559, 98 N. E. 975
(1912).
Courts which allow juror experi-
mentation are continually faced
with the problem of seeing that
the jury doesn't overstep its
bounds. The usual test employed
is: Was there any substantial
prejudice to the defendant, and
were any new facts introduced by
the jurors? State v. Stapleton, 155
Minn. 499, 193 N. W. 35 (1923);
Hoover v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. 600,
298 S. W. 438 (1927); Rehm v. State,
128 Tex. Cr. 59, 78 S. W. (2) 983
(1935). To answer this question
it is necessary for the court to get
some information on what actually
happened in the jury room. Affi-
davits by jurors seem the most
logical answer, but many courts
still cling to the old rule which
the common law contributed that
jurors may neither impeach their
verdicts nor sustain them by the
use of affidavits relating what did
or what didn't influence their de-
cisions. Cohn v. Wyngarden, 48
N. D. 344, 184 N. W. 575; Dartnell
v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743.
The case of Taylor v. Common-
wealth, 90 Va. 109, 17 S. E. 812
(1893) shows concretely how a
court by applying this rule can
sidestep the real issue. There, the
jurors took apart the defendant's
pistol and came to the conclusion
that the gun had been tampered
with between the time of the shoot-
ing and the time of the trial. Al-
though the juror affidavits con-
fessed that this experiment was the
sole cause for doubting the worth
of the defendant's courtroom dem-
onstration, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that there was no
error, since "there is no legal evi-
dence in the record that the gun
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was either taken to pieces or that
the jury acted on what they saw".
It seems clear that if this rule is
allowed to prevail in all cases
where experimentation is allowed,
the innocent defendant with a
meritorious defense is apt to be-
come the unfortunate victim of the
jurors' misunderstandings of the
exhibits.
Examination
Originally the only exhibits
which the common law allowed the
jurors to take to the jury room
were instruments under seal. 3
Wigmore, Evidence (1st ed. 1904)
§1913. That limitation effectively
prohibited any experimentation and
also greatly curtailed the pos-
sibilities of examination. The
statutory law of many states en-
larged this rule to include all pri-
vate records and public documents,
but in a number 9f these states
the courts have expanded the scope
of allowed examination to such an
extent that they have virtually
ignored all limitation.. In Washing-
ton, for example, one court held
that the defendant's hat and stirt
came within the statutory restric-
tion of " papers" and therefore could
be used by the jury. Doctor Jack,
an Indian, v. Territory, 2 Wash. T.
101, 3 P. 832 (1882). Today most
jurisdictions which have modified
old legal procedure and custom to
any great degree have allowed jury
room examination of all the ex-
hibits placed in evidence.
If the courts frown on jury room
experiments, why do they allow
jury room examination? The an-
swer to that question lies in the
fact that exhibits are necessary ex-
planations of testimonial evidence
-which "tend to give amid the
mass of variable quantities that
inevitably go to make up human
testimony, certain trustworthy con-
stants upon which the mind can
lean"-and that usually the brief
trial inspection is too superficial to
be sufficient Doctor Jack v. Terri-
tory, supra. When juries were first
introduced into the legal process,
jurors were chosen because of
their knowledge of the matter
under consideration. Today, how-
ever, jurors are chosen because
they know nothing of the case at
bar, and hence it is imperative that
they be given every chance to be-
come acquainted with the facts.
Where further scrutiny and closer
observation are necessary to gain
a true understanding of the ex-
hibits, courts will allow jury room
examination, and in most chses will
even allow the use of magnifying
glasses and microscopes or models
and facsimilies to achieve such an
end. Evans v. Commonwealth, 230
Ky. 411, 19 S. W. (2) 1091
(1929); Macklin v. State, 76 P. (2)
1091 (1938); Illinois Silver Mining
& Milling Co. v. Raff, 7 N. K. 336,
34 P. 544 (1893).
In the case under discussion we
have seen that the court allowed
what might well be termed an ex-
periment by the simple expedient
of calling it a "more critical ex-
amina~don" rather than an experi-
ment. While well settled definitions
distinguishing these terms do not
exist, probably the most helpful
explanation of examination is that
which allows jurors to use all of
their primary senses of perception
and which excludes as experimen-
tation that affirmative conduct
which results in the discovery of
facts not put into evidence at the
trial.
The theory that jurors should be
allowed to use all their sensory
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organs in the examination of ex-
hibits taken into the jury room was
given great impetus during the
reign of prohibition, when opinions
contained such phrases as these:
"It is proper to permit the jury to
look at and smell the liquor al-
leged to be intoxicating for the pur-
pose of determining its character.
It is like shutting their eyes to the
truth to do otherwise"--Enyart v.
People, 70 Colo. 362, 201 P. 564
(1921); "In passing on questions of
fact, jurors have the right to use
all their senses or such of them as
may be helpful in reaching a proper
conclusion". Troutner v. Common-
wealth, 135 Va. 750, 115 S. K. 693
(1923). Some of the courts, how-
ever, while extending examination
to the olfactory sense, refused to
allow jurors the privilege of exer-
cising their gustatory senses, one
of the grounds being the "exhibits'
intoxicating qualities and the dan-
ger of members of the jury abusing
the privilege while in their retire-
ment," and another, that it "is not
in keeping with an orderly and dig-
nified administration of justice."
Troutner v. Commonwealth, supra;
Gallaghan v. United States, 299 F.
172, C. C. A. (8th) (1924).
The question of whether or not
an exhibit should be taken by the
jury for closer examination is up
to the discretion of the court. If
the exhibit is likely to be used in
a manner inconsistent with the tes-
timony or has suggestive qualities
which would lead the jurors to im-
proper conclusions, the court should
refuse requests of jurors asking for
custody of the exhibit. People v.
Morris, 254 Ill. 559, 98 N. E. 975
(1912) (jurors took gruesome,
bloody garments to jury room);
State v. Lindeman, 64 N. D. 518,
254 N. W. 276 (1934) (only 1V2
ounces of liquor were in evidence,
and largeness of containers might
suggest liquor traffic to jurors).
Some courts have consistently
refused jurors permission to ex-
amine certain exhibits on the theory
that examination other than that
had during the trial, when the de-
fendant was present, makes the
jurors witnesses. In State v. Lind-
grove, 1 Kans. A. 51, 41 P. 688
(1895), the court held that to pre-
vent liquor-tasting jurors from be-
coming witnesses it would be neces-
sary to ascertain if all were equally
expert in taste and smell so that
all could receive the same kind of
evidence in the same manner. How-
ever, it seems that these courts,
when dealing with examination by
jurors (as opposed to experimenta-
tion), overlook the fact that jurors
who use merely their eyes and ears
would be subject to much the same
criticism, inasmuch as by seeing
and hearing they are forced to in-
terpret the meaning of exhibits-
just as they would be by smelling
or tasting. Also, the lack of
"equality of expertness" of jurors
on the all-senses jury, which the
court in State v. Lindgrove, supra,
laments, is no greater than that of
the jurors which are allowed only
to look and hear.
Although the court in the prin-
cipal case probably reached the
correct result in holding the de-
fendants guilty, its allowance of
jury experimentation (although it
called the jurors' act an "examina-
tion") was not the proper pro-
cedure and is not in accord with
the general rule as followed by the
majority of courts. The mere closer
examination of exhibits by jurors
in the jury room can be justified
on legal principles and on prac-
tical procedure, but the allowance
CRIMINAL CASES 617
of actual jury experimentation
cannot be so justified.
If the equitable determination of
the present case had required an
experiment to reveal the true na-
ture of the exhibits, the court
should have granted a court room
experiment, if such was agreed to
by both parties. Then both parties
would have had ample supervisory
powers to preclude the occurrence
of any reversible error. Perhaps
some days the two parties to a suit
will be allowed to enter the jury
room and supervise the conducting
of a juror experiment so that there
may be a clear understanding of
the evidence and yet no prejudice
to either party. But at the present,
it seems trial courts will best serve
the interest of justice if they refuse
all jury room experimentation.
TnHsoDoR H. K~osa.
ABORTION-DYING DzcLARATION-
CoitnosoAT o.- [Missouri] The
defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter committed by performing
an abortion which resulted in the
death of the woman. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Missouri re-
versed the conviction and held:
first, the state did not prove that
the operation for production of the
abortion was not necessary to save
the life of the woman; and second,
there ,was insufficient corroboration
to support the dying declaration
which the state introduced in evi-
dence. State v. Smith, 130 S. W.
(2d) 550, (Mo., 1939).
The problem confronting the
court in this case is unique to the
state of Missouri. It is one of two
states which has required corrobo-
ration to support a dying declara-
tion in prosecutions for manslaugh-
ter based on abortions or attempted
abortions Wigmore, Etidence (2d
ed. 1923), §1432 L n. The other
statute, in Pennsylvania, is worded
differently and is therefore not in
point.
Assuming that the state had
proved the first point which caused
the reversal of the conviction, what
is the amount of corroboration
which would be necessary t6 satisfy
the statutory requirement? Section
3690, Rev. Stat. Mo. 1929 (enacted
in 1907) provides, ' In prosecutions
for abortion or manslaughter oc-
casioned by abortion or miscar-
riage or by an attempt to produce-
either... the dying declarations of
the woman whose death is charged
to have been caused thereby shall
be competent evidence . . . pro-
vided . .. that no conviction shall
be based alone upon such declara-
tions unless corroborated as to the
fact that an abortion or miscar-
riage has taken place ...... The
court, in the principal case, based
its holding on the decision of State
v. Keller, 287 Mo. 124, 229 S. W. 203
(1920) which held that in a prose-
cution for manslaughter result-
ing from an abortion, it was nec-
essary to corroborate a dying dec-
laration by proving the deceased
was pregnant at the time of- the il-
legal operation. Outside of the dying
declaration, there was no corrob-
orating evidence that an operation
had been committed, so it was held
that pregnancy must be- shown in
order to corroborate tEe fact that
an abortion had taken place. It is
interesting to note the manner in
which the court arrived at its de-
cision. Section 4458, Rev. Stat. Mo.
1909 provides, "Any person who
with intent to produce or promote
a miscarriage or abortion ... ad-
ministers to a woman (whether
actually pregnant or not) . . . any
instrument or other method or
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device to produce an abortion (un-
less same is necessary to preserve
her life or that of an unborn child
.. .) shall in the event of the death
of said woman or any quick child...
upon conviction be adjudged guilty
of the felony of manslaughter ...
and in case no death ensue, such
person shall be guilty of the felony
of abortion." After stating this, the
court quoted the dying declaration
statute cited above. Then, instead
of applying Section 4458 supra,
which defined the crime of abor-
tion as being possible whether the
woman is pregnant or not, the court
went to Bouvier's Law Dictionary
which defined abortion as "the ex-
pulsion of the foetus at a period of
uterogestation so early that it has
not acquired the power of sustain-
ing an independent life" and de-
cided that a pregnancy must be
proven. It is peculiar that the court
should use Bouvier in light of the
statutory definition of Section 4458.
In State ex rel. Gaston v. Shields,
230 Mo. 91, 130 S. W. 298 (1910)
the court construed the statute as
showing a legislative intent "to
make it a felony for any person to
use any instrument upon a woman
whether pregnant or not." It also
stated that "Bouvier defines abor-
tion as the expulsion of the foetus,
but the word is not used in its ordi-
nary sense in the statute. The
word miscarriage (abortion) in its
legal acception, does not neces-
sarily include the destruction of
the child before its birth." The
court in the Keller case seems to
have completely misconstrued the
dying declaration statute in requir-
ing that pregnancy had to be shown
to corroborate the fact that an
abortion had taken place. If other
evidence can be found to show an
abortion, it alone should be suffi-
cient to corroborate a dying dec-
laration.
If it were not necessary to prove
a pregnancy, or if it were proved
in the principal case as required
by the court, what other evidence
would be sufficient to satisfy the
corroboration requirement? The
principal case differs essentially
from State v. Keller in that in the
Keller case, no evidence as to how
the deceased came by her death is
given outside of the dying declara-
tion. In the instant case, the physi-
cian who performed the autopsy
testified that the immediate cause
of the death was a hemorrhage
caused by an abscess that spread
from a rupturing of the vaginal
wall. A jagged hole was found in
the vaginal wall, which could have
been made "by a blunt instrument
like a curet" being inserted therein.
This, the court held, was not suf-
ficient corroboration because even
if it might be inferred that an effort
at an abortion had taken place,
there was still no corroboration as
to who had performed the opera-
tion and when it had been per-
formed. In requiring such cor-
roboration to be given, the court
read words into the statute which
a literal interpretation of the stat-
ute does not demand.
Moreover at common law, where
a dying declaration was admissible,
no corroboration of any sort was
required in order to sustain a con-
viction. Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) §1451. It is a well established
principle, that where a statute is
in derogation of the common law,
the statute is to be strictly con-
strued. State v. Dalton, 134 Mo.
App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132 (1909);
Thomas v. Malone, 142 Mo. App.
193, 126 S. W. 522 (1910). Under
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this view, no change should be
made in the common law other
than expressly provided for in the
statute. Although Missouri, in 1917,
passed a law providing that statutes
in derogation of the common law
be liberally construed, (Laws of
1917, p. 324), this statute was held
not to apply to existing legislation.
Taft v. Talman, 277 Mo. 157, 209
S. W. 471 (1919). Since Section
5240 was in existence before 1917,
it should be given the strict com-
mon law interpretation. The stat-
ute requires only corroboration as
to the fact that an abortion has
taken place; this and nothing more
should be required to be corrob-
orated. The court seems to have
gone too far in asking who per-
formed the abortion and when it
was performed. This ought to be
left to the jury to be weighed from
the facts set out in the dying dec-
larationi itself, as was done under
the common law. Wigmore, Evi-
dence (2d ed. 1923) § 1451. The
court in requiring these facts to be
corroborated, was actually weigh-
ing the sufficiency of the dying
declaration in its entirety which
was contrary to the intention of the
statute.
EDwIN M RAmI.
